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**ARROWS IN THE QUIVER
DOMINANT LANDPOWER FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT IN THE
21ST CENTURY**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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The Fiscal Year 1999 United States Army Posture Statement to Congress states that the six Army imperatives—Quality People, Training, Leader Development, Modern Equipment, Doctrine and Force Mix are **mandates for success** in accomplishing all missions across the full range of military operations.¹ The synchronization and balance of these imperatives are therefore *sine qua non* to our ability to shape the geostrategic security environment, respond to crises, and prepare for an uncertain future in accordance with the national security and military strategies. This paper proposes that the imperative of force mix is not in balance with these three requirements, and that this condition will worsen as the gap between the nations that "have" and the nations that "have not" increases. It also recommends how Army mission forces might be modified to achieve landpower dominance with greater full spectrum capability and agility, without sacrificing lethality as we meet the challenges of a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous world now and into the foreseeable future.

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PREFACE

Military leaders and historians alike argue over the true revolutions in military affairs. By its definition, a revolution suggests a paradigm shift has occurred in how war is waged. Some cite examples like the invention of smokeless gunpowder or the repeating rifle. Others use the example of the longbow or the invention of the tank. Now information dominance through technology is debated as the next harbinger of success on the battlefield.

This paper suggests we must not only think of the longbow, but more importantly the arrows delivered by it. If the arrows are not *straight and true* they will not strike their intended target. If they are not *hard and resiliant* they will not penetrate the enemies' shields. If they are not *sharp* the enemy will not fear them as a weapon. If they are not *swift* the enemy will easily avoid them. If they are not *lean*, the arrow will not have the reach to fulfill its intended purpose.

The arrows in the quiver of the Department of Defense are its military forces. Having the right type of arrows is *sine qua non* to our national interest of remaining a global superpower. As the decisive land force for the nation, our Army must ensure that every arrow meets the aforementioned rigid standards. With so few arrows in the quiver, every one must be capable of killing the most feared opponent. To do less is to invite disaster.

Arrows in the Quiver, highlights warnings of an imbalanced force, and proposes an alternative to lead us into the 21st century.

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ARROWS IN THE QUIVER
THE ENVIRONMENT—WHO AND WHERE WE MUST FIGHT

The National Defense University's 1998 Strategic Assessment concludes there is no sign of a great-power rivalry in the foreseeable future. In fact, the three largest states most often cited as wild cards capable of becoming peer competitors—China, India, and Russia—have all embarked on a transition of economic reform and integration.²

Although great-power rivals do not currently exist, the world promises to remain a dangerous place. Regional threats with significant military power use coercion and large-scale, cross border aggression against U.S. allies and friends in key regions.³ Failed or failing nation-states are creating instability, internal conflict, and humanitarian crises within regions where the United States has vital or important interests. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic and cruise missile technology facilitate our adversaries' capabilities to threaten American citizens and property at home and abroad.⁴

Interconnectedness, the linkage between nations and peoples through international business and information technologies, and demassification, the diminishing need for massing of people and equipment to achieve an end, are advancing at different rates in

different parts of the world. The result is a global system composed of three tiers which is becoming increasingly urbanized.⁵

In order to accomplish the national security imperative of global engagement, US forces must be capable of shaping, and responding to the threats that exist in each tier that comprise our world. The next chapter describes this global environment.

INFORMATION SOCIETY-TECHNOLOGY IS THE ANSWER TO EVERYTHING

First tier nation-states represent the world's most developed societies in terms of national wealth, technological advances, and information based economies. Demassification and interconnectedness are most strongly felt here.⁶

Military forces of these states principally protect national economic interests and alleviate humanitarian crises. Consequently, aversion to violence will be a prominent component of the first tier ethical system.⁷ War among first tier states is unlikely due to their interconnectedness through international business.

In order to protect their interests throughout the world, first tier nations will principally maintain expeditionary military forces. These forces will apply technology and

information based systems in an effort to minimize collateral damage and the loss of life on both sides of the conflict.

SECOND TIER NATIONALISM-BIGGER IS BETTER

Second tier nations are characterized by intense nationalism, major industrialization, and large standing military forces. Military strategies tend to be Clausewitzean in their approach to conflict resolution—total war using mass destruction.⁸

Industrialized nation-states will employ Just War arguments to legitimize their use of asymmetrical as well as conventional means to achieve desired political ends. Rogue states like Iraq and North Korea, and nationalist states like Serbia, and India are examples of industrial based nation-states with both significant conventional and asymmetric means to counter challenges to their national sovereignty.

THIRD TIER SURVIVALISM-BROTHER CAN YOU SPARE A DIME

Third tier nations are primarily agrarian societies; "these civilizations are often characterized by economic stagnation, ungovernability, and violence."⁹ Weak governance in these regions also fosters transnational actors who exercise freedom to pursue organizational interests at the expense of the indigenous peoples. Warlords in Somalia, the Taliban Militia in Afghanistan, and nationalist rebels in Chechnya are all examples

of the 3rd tier threat and capability we will face in the 21st century.

These forces will use conventional as well as asymmetrical means to attack U.S. military vulnerabilities. Dr. Jeffrey Record, a Senior Research Fellow at Georgia Tech's Center for International Strategy, Technology and Policy, poignantly highlights the challenge of 1st versus 3rd tier conflict in *The Creeping Irrelevance of US Force Planning* when he said—

The "world's fourth largest army" proved less effective against U.S. forces in the Gulf in 1991 than did Mohamed Faraah Aideed's relative few, poorly equipped, and doped-up "technicals" in Mogadishu just 3 years later.¹⁰

THE GLOBAL VILLAGE-BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

A particularly challenging aspect of the future security environment is urbanization and the increasing likelihood of military operations in cities.¹¹ The likelihood of an urban battlefield can be explained in numerous ways. From a demographic perspective, the United Nations estimates that 150,000 people per day move into cities of developing countries. By 2025 three-fifths of the world's population will live in urban areas.¹²

From an operational perspective, we can assume that our future adversaries have learned the lessons of the Gulf War, and therefore will not challenge the U.S. with conventional, large

scale armored formations, air superiority forces, and deep-water naval fleets.¹³ Rather, they will disperse in cities among the populace to negate U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) advantages and the joint operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and full dimensional protection.

Economically, although cities have always been important military objectives, their significance is growing as the international economy becomes increasingly information based.¹⁴ International markets and business opportunities define whether the United States is achieving one of its vital national interests—economic well-being through access to global markets. These markets are located in and controlled from urbanized terrain.

THE 21ST CENTURY MILITARY CHALLENGE—WHAT WE MUST DO

THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

As we prepare to enter the 21st century, the United States finds itself in an unprecedented position. "Our military might is unparalleled; a dynamic global economy offers increasing opportunities for American jobs and American investment; and the community of democratic nations is growing, enhancing the prospects for political stability, peaceful conflict resolution and greater hope for the people of the world."¹⁵

These opportunities drive the national security imperative of global engagement. The implementing strategy includes all of the instruments of national power. However, our focus is defining the military's role in supporting the security strategy.¹⁶

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY NOW AND FOR AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

The National Military Strategy is based on three tenets—shape, respond, and prepare now.¹⁷ To achieve the global engagement imperative, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued guidance for the composition and characteristics of the future force. Forces as a whole must be multi-mission capable; proficient in their core warfighting competencies and able to transition smoothly from a peacetime posture to swift execution of multiple missions across the full spectrum of operations. Additionally services must find the appropriate balance between the exploitation of advanced technology and the recognition that most military missions remain manpower intensive.¹⁸

FORCES AVAILABLE TO MEET THE THREATS-WHAT WE HAVE

One can not enter an Army force structure debate without first examining what the other services bring to the fight. Sister service core competencies are their contribution to joint warfighting.

THE AIR FORCE CONTRIBUTION-A DECISIVE FORCE CAPABILITY

The Air Force possesses six core competencies that contribute to our nation's total military capability—*Air and Space Superiority, Precision Engagement, Global Attack, Rapid Global Mobility, Information Superiority and Agile Combat Support*. Together, these competencies not only suggest that the Air Force can support decisive operations, but rather in certain circumstances can be the decisive force.¹⁹

The Air Force's updated core competencies, published in September 1997, are important because they represent a new way of thinking strategically about the application of air power. An argument can be made that air power was the decisive force in the Gulf War, while the land component provided the *coup de grace* as a supporting effort at the conclusion of an extensive air operation. Analysis from the Air Force's Gulf War Air Power Survey reinforces this point, concluding that 61 percent of all

destroyed Iraqi tanks were attributable to allied fixed-wing aircraft.²⁰

Dissenters argue that the land component accomplished in 100 hours, what the air component could not do in five weeks. These are parochial, service-centered perspectives. All services clearly understand that troops on the ground are required to seize, and maintain terrain, and are the ultimate statement of U.S. resolve. The point, however, is that increasingly land power may be required to secure a victory rather than achieve it, at least in the most fluid situations of high intensity mechanized conflict.²¹ This will only be possible on battlefields dominated by open terrain.

NAVY FORCES-FROM THE SEA

Naval expeditionary forces' inherent characteristics include readiness, flexibility, sustainability, and mobility. These characteristics make naval expeditionary forces uniquely suited for first response to crises at sea and along the world's littorals. When these forces arrive, they bring with them four critical operational capabilities for Combatant Commanders—command, control, and surveillance; battlespace dominance; power projection; and force sustainment.²²

Command, control, and surveillance are the foundation of unity of command along the littorals and at sea. *Battlespace dominance* provides the synergistic affect of force protection for all forces; land, air or sea. The Navy visualizes this capability as establishing zones of superiority, surrounding one or more units or even the entire force, that are shifted as the situation requires.²³

The Navy's cornerstone for effective deterrence, crisis response, and war is its ability to project high-intensity power from the sea.²⁴ From its available forces, the Navy can take the battle to the enemy before he has the opportunity to reach initial objectives.²⁵

The fourth Naval capability is *force sustainment*. Successful global response to contingencies depends upon our ability to project and sustain U.S. forces in all theaters of operations.²⁶ This is especially critical to the Army.

THE MARINE CORPS—EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN READINESS

The Marine Corps of the 21st century will maintain an active force of three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs).²⁷ Their core competency will continue to be the nation's naval, combined arms, expeditionary force in readiness.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps, describes the capability and competencies of his service to be both versatile and decisive. The Marines' versatility and inherent combined arms capability make them the premier crisis response force. Their most current warfighting doctrine, developed in 1996, entitled "Operational Maneuver from the Sea", focuses on rapid maneuver by landing forces from their ships directly to objectives ashore.²⁸ This forcible entry capability will become increasingly important in the 21st century as our ability to base forces overseas declines.

With two-thirds of the world's surface covered by water, and the vast majority of its inhabitants living within 200 miles of the sea, the Marines can doctrinally deploy and support their operations around the globe from Naval platforms. While the Marines are uniquely suited for crisis response, this is principally achieved through forward presence forces. When deployed, these forces send a clear signal to would be adversaries of U.S. capability. What they can not do, is achieve strategic or operational surprise.

THE ARMY—A FULL (?) SPECTRUM FORCE OF DECISION

The United States Army's mission is to fight and win the nation's wars as the force of decision.²⁹ It's force structure is based on a strategy that attempts to balance the national

security imperative of global engagement with the worse case scenario of two near simultaneous Major Theater Wars (MTWs).

To accomplish its mission, the Army will maintain four active corps, 10 active divisions—including six heavy and four light divisions—and two active armored cavalry regiments.³⁰ Additionally, and equally important are the capabilities provided by the Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR).³¹

The Army **shapes** the geostrategic environment by *compelling* our enemies to comply with our demands; *deters* potential adversaries through forward presence operations; *reassures* allies through stability operations; and *supports* domestic authorities in times of disaster and civil disturbance. Maintaining high levels of readiness in its deployable force, sustaining brigade sets of pre-positioned equipment, and projecting Army units using Air Force strategic lift and Navy fast sealift assets, give the Army its **respond** capability. The Army is **preparing now** for the uncertain future through its Force XXI process of experimentation, demonstration, and comprehensive assessment.³²

WATERING THE SEEDS OF DISASTER-WARNINGS OF FORCE IMBALANCE

Reading the core competencies of the various services gives one a warm feeling of security. However, the resource constraints and high operational tempo facing our forces suggest we should be gravely concerned. While all services face challenges in this period of strategic pause, this paper focuses solely on the Army.

The Army's six imperatives—Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organizations, Materiel, and Soldiers serve as a mechanism for making the case that our current force mix is unbalanced, a fact that will be exacerbated by the demands of the 21st century.

The Army's keystone doctrinal manual is FM 100-5, Operations. It prescribes that the strategic Army must have five capabilities: full-dimensional operations, fight as part of joint, combined, UN and interagency forces, be rapidly deployable, expandible, and capable of decisive victory.³³ The Army achieves these capabilities through the synergy of its various type organizations. The paradox is that by having organizations that can only perform some of the capabilities, the Army has weakened itself as a whole to do all of them. Some examples are the decision to cut infantry from mechanized divisions in a world that is becoming increasingly urbanized,

and maintaining light divisions that have the same tactical mobility of their forefathers 50 years previous, or digitizing Armored Cavalry Regiments as Strike Forces that have little utility in operations short of major theater war. All are examples of doctrine and organization being out of synch with 21st century reality.

A symptom of force structure imbalance to meet the demands of today and the 21st century is the current status of task force level training proficiency. Earlier this year, Congress began to question the readiness of the force, citing undermanned units arriving at the National Training Center with decreased tactical acumen in execution for their biennial exercises, a training deficiency that, theoretically, cannot be made up for two years.³⁴

Leader Development for the 21st century Army has been complicated by force protection requirements for asymmetrical threats and the plethora of information available to leaders at all levels. Leveraging technology to achieve situational dominance is good. Unfortunately, we are unintentionally instilling in our leaders the need for perfect situational awareness before making decisions. The result will be TOC-bound commanders who are timid and averse to taking prudent risk.

The *organizational* imbalance within the Army can be seen in the composition of our reserve forces as well as the type units

that make up our active mission forces. The 175,000 personnel in the reserve force structure make up 54% of the total Army. The Total Army Analysis for 2003 concluded that of this reserve force of eight divisions and 15 enhanced separate brigades, only 30,000 soldiers are assumed to fight in either of a two major theater of war conflict.³⁵

Many of our specialized and unique service support units reside predominantly in the reserves, but not in sufficient numbers. These dedicated professionals face the delimma of a high operational tempo to support deployments while simultaneously maintaining full time civilian employment. The resulting outcome is increased pressure from business leaders to not support employees joining the reserve components.

The imbalance of forces within the active component is based on the type of combat units available to execute our national military strategy. The near to mid-term future force mix is designed around four types of forces; Special Operations, Strike, Contingency, and Campaign.³⁶ The problem with the force mix is in the lack of versatility within these units, which limits the forces available for various missions required to satisfy the voracious appetite of the global engagement imperative.

The majority of our operations today require rapid deployment and support and stability operations, however the

majority of our active force is designed for major ground mechanized warfare. Consider the fact, that within our six active heavy divisions, there are only seven mechanized infantry brigades to execute the global engagement strategy.




Figure 1 - Force XXI Heavy Division Design

FROM ARMED FORCES JOURNAL INTERNATIONAL.,
(Vol 135/# 12), pp. 35, Building Down by
General William Hartog. Reproduced with
Permission.

The synergistic nature of future joint and combined warfare and the urbanization of the geopolitical landscape mandate that the force mix change.

A senior

management challenge for the future is the prioritization of investment capital to meet the materiel needs of the 21st century Army. Most military leaders and scholars agree that our adversaries will not fight us tank for tank on the next battlefield. Yet our investment capital is focused on digitizing and modernizing an armor-based Army. The Abrams tank at 68.4 Tons, can not fit on many of the second and third world

streets or bridges where their need will be greatest in the future. This is not an argument that the M1A2 main battle tank is not needed...most assuredly it will be needed for many years. Our problem again is balance and versatility without taking into account the nature and synergy of joint warfare or the 21st century battlefield.

Instead of making our light forces more lethal, we deactivated our light armored forced entry capability, and only recently placed emphasis on modernizing the more strategically agile divisions.³⁷ Emphasis in this regard has centered on the individual soldier's equipment. Improvements in tactical mobility remain unchanged.

The Army prides itself on being a people based, not an equipment based organization. The Army is required to control land and populace. Control of either, requires physical interaction (willing or forced) with people. Our focus is shifting from equipping the man to manning the equipment.

Not having units that are full spectrum capable, puts a greater demand on units with capabilities most in need for global engagement. We can measure the effects on our people in numerous ways. The current recruitment of the force is an example. Army recruiting fell 15,000 personnel short of FY 97 quotas, but was alleviated by a DoD decision to reduce Army end strength from 495,000 to 480,000.³⁸ Operational tempo is one of

the contributing factors to this personnel deficit. Similarly, the high OPTEMPO of many reserve units has caused a decline in reserve retention as well.

DOMINANT LAND FORCE FOR THE WORLD AS IT WILL BE—WHAT WE NEED

Few military defeats in history were as stunning as the defeat of the French and Allied forces in northeastern France in May 1940....The French were prepared. The problem was that they "had formulated a doctrine, organized and equipped...units, and trained...for the wrong type of war".³⁹

With this quote in mind, we can now explore a force mix proposal that emulates the German rather than the French conditions of 1940. In order to be more versatile, agile, and lethal in each of the three tiers of 21st century society, all of our mission forces must change. There is no room for a light division, three specialized cavalry regiments formed as strike forces, or a force mix that is still reminiscent of the Cold War Army.

Mission forces in this proposal fall into four categories; special operations forces, contingency forces, campaign forces, and stability defense forces. Each category is built around the Total Army concept.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Special Operations Forces (SOF) will continue to play a valuable role as both a shaper and responder in the 21st century. A peace engagement strategy requires interaction with

people. Special Forces are uniquely qualified for the important task of shaping as part of this strategy.⁴⁰ Therefore, the structure of our SOF does not change with the exception of one important addition—the creation of an Information Attack Brigade.

The *Information Attack Brigade* provides an offensive capability to augment lethal methods of warfare. This force focuses on asymmetrical attack of militarily relevant targets; C4I systems, power grids, urban infrastructure and key military decision-makers, most commonly associated with tier one and two nations. Following the principles of Sun Tsu, their mission is to create chaos and induce nonlinearity in organizations that depend on order, information, and predictability. The capability resides in the Army to ensure smooth transition for the land component from decisive combat to stability operations.

CONTINGENCY FORCES

Contingency forces in this proposal are comprised of eight combat divisions and four separate brigades. There are two types of contingency force divisions—Strike and Assault. The preponderance of CONUS based forces are organized around two Contingency Corps, one focused east the other west. Each has two strike and one assault division, and two separate armored brigades. The two remaining contingency divisions are both

strike units; one located in Europe, and the other in the Pacific.




Figure 2 - Contingency Corps Organization

Power projection capability for these forces is a critically important characteristic. Therefore, four of the strike divisions have forcible entry

capability, one in each Contingency Corps, and both forward-based units.⁴¹


The Strike Division

The six *Strike Divisions* are all rapidly deployable, versatile, and full spectrum capable. The force entry variant relies on airborne and air assault capable units to seize critical aerial ports of debarkation and establish lodgments for the rapid build up of combat power. Having this capability gives the CINC an early entry ground force capable of strategic and operational surprise.

The Strike Division base is its three infantry brigade combat teams of approximately 5,000 soldiers. Similarity to existing divisions ends here. Full spectrum dominance for this

force is achieved through enablers provided by the division.

Tactical agility, precision strike, lethality, versatility, speed, knowledge, and flexibility are all characteristics of this organization.



battalion of Future Infantry Vehicles (FIV), and a battalion equipped with the Armored Gun System (or the next generation light armored kinetic energy vehicle).

The FIV battalion's mission is to rapidly maneuver infantry across open terrain to destroy enemy forces and to seize and retain ground. Additionally it provides protection and maneuver in urbanized terrain, and facilitates the closure of attacking forces through the killing zone in offensive operations. The FIV is designed to carry a nine-man squad plus a driver and gunner/commander. The FIV will probably be a wheeled vehicle.⁴²

The FIV battalion has enough vehicles to move three infantry battalions of one brigade. Vehicles must fit on the C130J, and be air drop and sling capable to facilitate forcible entry operations. The command relationships and integration of this organization into the brigade combat team parallel the current day aviation task force commander's relationship to a brigade commander.

The second battalion in the LAB is an AGS (or advanced technology follow on light armored) battalion. The battalion is air droppable, light weight, and can kill all known armor today. Critics will argue that the AGS is not the ideal offensive system. However, we must consider the synergy of joint combat and mission tailoring in the 21st century, and whether killing a tank with a tank remains the most effective and efficient method. Air power, brilliant attack munitions for artillery systems, and Army attack aircraft suggest it is not. The versatility, size, and rapid fire gun on the AGS make it ideal for urban warfare.

The LAB trains the AGS and FIV battalion in combined arms maneuver. It is capable of exercising operational control of additional armored or mechanized battalions from assault divisions based on mission tailoring requirements.

The Artillery (DIVARTY) in the Strike Division provides a precision strike and lethal capability that does not exist in

today's light division DIVARTY. The three battalions of 105mm howitzers are replaced by two battalions of 155mm towed howitzers, and one battalion of deep strike artillery which includes two batteries of Crusader and a battery of the Highly Mobile Artillery System (HIMARS).

The Crusader batteries provide precise, long-range fires out to a range of 40 plus kms, while maintaining a rate of fire of 10-12 rounds per minute.⁴³ HIMARS provides early entry forces MLRS capability to conduct counterfire, suppression of enemy air defenses, and destruction of material and personnel targets.⁴⁴

Extended range, reduced footprint, increased rate of fire, improved lethality, and enhanced precision make the Strike DIVARTY a powerful organization with precise deep strike capability.

The Strike Division Aviation Brigade is comprised of three battalion-sized units capable of precision strike, speed, knowledge, dominant maneuver and force protection. The Aviation Brigade has a cavalry squadron, an attack battalion, and an assault battalion.

The Divisional Cavalry Squadron has two air troops and three ground troops. The air troops are equipped with the RAH-66 to perform armed and light attack reconnaissance missions. The ground troops are equipped with the FIV and Line of Sight Anti-tank (LOSAT) to provide a formidable covering force capability

to protect the force and conduct limited strike operations against vulnerable high payoff targets of opportunity.⁴⁵

The Attack Battalion is formed around a mix of two companies each of RAH-66 Comanche and AH-64D Apache Longbow aircraft. Comanches are more rapidly deployable by strategic airlift, and may be "enough" attack capability for a given mission. Longbow companies give the Division commander additional deep strike capability to fight a tier two armored threat.

The Assault Battalion gives the ground tactical commander flexibility, limited forcible entry capability, dominant ground maneuver, speed, and knowledge. Equipped primarily with the UH-60, this battalion must also have a company of CH-47Ds to provide Air Assault lift for the 155mm howitzers in the DIVARTY and the FIV.⁴⁶

The final brigade sized combat organization in a Strike Division is its Reserve Component, Enhanced Armor Brigade. This separate brigade is equipped with the M1A2 Main Battle Tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. It consists of two Armored Battalions and one Mechanized Infantry Battalion. This heavy force is capable of deploying by air to Army Pre-positioned Stocks in theater, or by sea with its organic equipment to the designated AOR.

The Assault Division

There are two Assault Divisions; one in each of the two CONUS based contingency corps. The Assault Division conducts distributed operations using maneuver and firepower facilitated by information dominance to destroy enemy forces and to seize and retain ground. It is capable of a full range of stability




Figure 4 - Assault Division Organization

Limited Conversion Design (LCD) division with several major exceptions.

Like the LCD, the Assault Division is built around three maneuver brigades; two infantry heavy and one armor heavy. Each brigade has three maneuver battalions. The tank strength in both is the same at 221 M1A2 MBTs.⁴⁸

The Assault Division differs from the LCD Division in its infantry strength. The LCD Division reduces the infantry TOE to

operations and support operations in a joint and multinational environment.⁴⁷ It parallels the design, organization, and equipment of the

three companies. This is a reduction of 78 BFVs and 306 infantrymen. This is totally inconsistent with the threat and environment of the 21st century. The Assault Division has reinstated these valuable units which give the division its full spectrum capability.

The Aviation Brigade of the Assault Division replicates the Strike Division structure with three exceptions. The Cavalry ground troops are equipped with the FIV, have a platoon of LOSAT, but additionally have a platoon of M1A2 MBTs. The Assault Battalion has no organic CH-47Ds since all of its howitzers are self-propelled, and the Attack Battalions differ in mix of aircraft. In the Assault Division the company mix is three to one Apache Longbow to Comanche.

The Assault Division has an enhanced brigade as well. It too has an active duty brigade command and staff core, augmented by the National Guard. The enhanced brigade for the Assault Divisions are mechanized infantry, equipped with the BFV.

Separate Armored Brigades (SAB)

Four SABs provide additional mission tailoring flexibility to the two Contingency Corps Commander. These autonomous brigades, two per Corps, are commanded by Brigadier Generals. Their mission is to augment Strike Divisions with decisive ground combat capability. When faced with potential armored

adversaries, one of these brigades would immediately follow the initial deploying maneuver brigade of a Strike Division.

CAMPAIGN FORCES

Campaign forces are forward-deployed divisions, in regions we anticipate the potential for a MTW, this is currently viewed to be Iraq and North Korea. Since the majority of our forces are CONUS based, these divisions must be more robust, lethal, and have additional capabilities for self-sustainment until contingency forces arrive in theater.

SWA Division

The SWA Division is Armor heavy with three maneuver brigades. It has a MLRS battalion due to the open nature and long range acquisition opportunities afforded by the terrain. And has three AH-64D Apache Longbow Battalions vice the one in the Strike and Assault Division.

Politically it is unfeasible to have all of these forces forward deployed in Kuwait or another regional country. However, it is feasible to maintain the Division Staff, one of the maneuver brigades, an attack battalion, and a preponderance of the DIVARTY permanently in country. The remainder of the Division could be based in Europe. This command structure and force design provides a significantly more stable security and

training environment for the interests at risk and the forces involved.⁴⁹

Korea Division

The Korea Division takes advantage of the compartmented terrain of the Korean peninsula, the nature of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) threat, and the strength of the Republic of Korea's (ROK) ground forces.

Unlike the DMZ of June 1950, today's DMZ is heavily defended, fortified, and mined. Urban sprawl has overtaken most high speed avenues of approach into the south, making rapid advances from the north unlikely.

The Korea Division leverages all these factors in its design. Consequently, it is an aviation heavy organization that can rapidly bypass obstacle belts, maneuver across compartmented, and dissected terrain, seize and hold ground, and maintain firepower overmatch against armored and infantry threats.

The Division is built around four maneuver brigades. The ground units are armor heavy and FIV-equipped infantry. Aviation units include an attack and an assault brigade. The armor brigade is configured with two tank and one mechanized infantry battalion equipped with the BFV.

The infantry brigade consists of three FIV-equipped infantry battalions and one Anti-tank battalion. All of the infantry battalions are capable of movement by CH-47D.⁵⁰

An Attack Aviation Brigade with three battalions of AH-64Ds provides dominant maneuver, precision strike, and firepower overmatch against infantry and armored threats. While the Assault Aviation Brigade provides dominant maneuver with its CH-47D and UH-60 battalion. It is unique in its force mix due to the requirement to sling the organic fighting vehicle for the infantry brigade.

Division Artillery is designed to counter enemy long range artillery, provide accurate direct support fires, and to conduct Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) for air assaults. The infantry brigade has a direct support 155mm towed howitzer battalion. The armor brigade is supported by a crusader battalion. The Division also has a MLRS and a second Crusader battalion to support counter fire, deep attack and SEAD missions.

The capabilities inherent in this division make it ideal for defending against an armored threat, seizing and holding terrain, and participating in counter offensive operations.

STABILITY DEFENSE FORCES

Stability Defense Forces (SDF) fall into two subcategories, strategic reserve and homeland defense. These forces are principally manned by our reserve component. The strategic reserve consists of four mechanized infantry divisions equipped with the BFM and the M1A2 MBT.⁵¹ This force gives the Army its sustained land warfare capability in the event of protracted ground combat.

The preponderance of our SDF are homeland defense units. Their structure includes counter WMD units, military police brigades, peace enforcement brigades, patriot battalions, reinforcing artillery brigades, chem-bio detection battalions, and combat service support units. These capabilities and type units reside in each of ten regional defense zones covering the United States.⁵² These units provide force protection for homeland key facilities, assist in counter narcotics operations and support crisis response to asymmetrical attack.

Regional SDFs participate in a national rotation schedule to support *stability and support operations* (SASO) much like the Air Force's expeditionary force concept. The end result is predictability for the soldier, enhanced protection of the force and key facilities, more force structure available to support active component CSS shortfalls, and a streamlined

infrastructure that meets the demands of SASO and decisive combat operations.

BIGGER IS NOT BETTER...BETTER IS BETTER(COMPARING THE PROPOSALS)

The current Army XXI plan does not significantly change the tactical mobility of its six light divisions, greatly increase their lethality, or enhance their decisive strike capability with shock and speed. Heavy divisions are ill-equipped to conduct operations in closed terrain or control populations due to lack of infantry.

The most immediate benefit of the new proposal is *true full spectrum capability* for all combat divisions. The addition of infantry force structure and tactical lift aviation make the Assault Division capable of fighting in closed terrain, against tier 3 threats in counterinsurgency operations, and in heavily populated areas requiring population control. The addition of the Land Assault Brigade, enhanced attack aviation, and longer reaching and more lethal fire support in the Strike Division, make it a force more than capable of mid and high intensity warfare against mechanized forces.

Another major advantage of the new force structure proposal is its *versatility, flexibility and adaptability to mission tailoring*. Four Separate Armor Brigades provide Contingency

Corps Commanders with a rapidly deployable, armored decisive ground capability that can greatly enhance our contingency forces. Campaign Divisions deter enemy hostilities in our most vulnerable theaters and represent a formidable force, optimized for the terrain and threat in the region. Reserve component forces are organized to enhance our strengths, reduce vulnerabilities, and facilitate military dominance in a three-tiered world.

The current proposal is not flexible or versatile. Critical core functions within the division reside in the reserve component, and consequently require a Presidential Selective Reserve Call-Up (PSRC) to deploy the force. Lack of infantry in heavy divisions mandate augmentation from the light force to conduct operations in closed terrain. Light divisions do not have the tactical mobility, lethal tactical fires, precision strike, or deep strike capability to fight a peer competitor or tier 2 mechanized threat in open terrain without significant augmentation from a heavy division. Flexibility and versatility are limited by the Cold War structure of the force.

The proposed force structure in this paper provides greater *forcible entry capability for an expeditionary Army*. The likelihood of air and sea port denial becomes an increasingly important consideration as we become more force projection oriented. The ability to seize decisive points of entry in a

Joint Operational Area is *sine qua non* to our way of fighting.

Each of the four Corps has a formidable force entry capability, with the two Contingency Corps being the more robust.

The current plan relies on three brigade-sized strike forces, each with less than two battalions of infantry to seize initial entry decisive points. Global urbanization and the need to control people will make this force incapable of sustaining forcible entry operations without significant early entry follow on forces. Excluding one battalion in Europe, our conventional Army capability resides only in 18th Airborne Corps.

While the full spectrum Strike Division is heavier than a light division, its modularity, lethality, and small footprint make it *rapidly deployable* while still being capable. Assault Divisions will be less deployable than the Army XXI division, but will be full spectrum capable upon arrival in theater. In theater campaign forces, SOF, and Strike Divisions, in concert with our sister services prevent the enemy from reaching initial objectives and consolidating ill-gotten gains during the initial phase of hostilities. Assault Divisions and other follow on forces provide the coup de main in a major regional conflict.

The current Army XXI structure rapidly deploys a less capable light force, or very predictably deploys a heavier force to vulnerable prepositioned equipment. In either case "being the first with the most" does not occur.

The strategic operational tempo required to support a global engagement imperative is reduced in the proposed structure by more efficient use of reserve components. Enhanced Brigades round up active duty combat divisions, while the four division strategic reserve guarantees sustained dominant landpower in protracted ground combat. Stability Defense Forces enable us to sustain stability and support operations in smaller scale contingencies, while simultaneously providing for a coherent homeland defense through the creation of stability defense zones. Savings in personnel and unit restructuring allow for the creation of more combat service support (CSS) infrastructure to sustain an expeditionary Army.

The existing Army XXI plan maintains eight reserve divisions, none of which are committed to contingency plans. Lack of adequate reserve component CSS infrastructure makes us ill-prepared to support an expeditionary Army in protracted land combat. Homeland defense efforts rely on regional teams to coordinate with interagency authorities, vice linking reserve force structure and leadership to FEMA regions for smooth and effective coordination in times of national disaster.

Finally, a lighter but more lethal force requires less strategic lift to project power to the point of decision. SOF and contingency forces will require a substantially smaller number of air and sea platforms to project like capabilities in

existing force structure to a given region. This new force will not be tethered to major land prepositioned stocks which will be extremely vulnerable to future enemy attack.

CONCLUSION

Some men see things as they are and say, why; I dream things that never were and say, why not.

-President John F. Kennedy; June 28, 1963

The geostrategic environment of the 21st century will be complex, dangerous, and demanding; with threats to United States interests rising from each of the three tiers of our global society. To remain the world's preeminent military power, the United States must be ready to dominate its adversaries in each of these tiers.

Our current plan for future Army force structure does not accomplish this aim. It is a force built principally to fight two nearly simultaneous MTWs against tier two threats. The Army's focus on long range, precision strike, open terrain, mechanized maneuver will make us optimally equipped to win the last war. Unfortunately, like the French in 1940, we will have better equipment than our adversaries, but will not be able to use it against the preponderance of threats we will face.

All of our active component combat units must be full spectrum capable. We must be equipped with the technology to dominate any tier one and two mechanized or armor threat, but

equally lethal and capable of dealing with the more likely tier three non-state actors, counter-insurgencies, or regional peace enforcement operations. This is accomplished by creating fighting units that leverage technology, while not sacrificing the essence of an Army's need to control land and people.

The global engagement national security imperative mandates that we focus on rapid deployability around the world. Hence the creation of eight active component contingency divisions; six Strike and two Assault, and four separate armor brigades. Both types of divisions can fight the full spectrum of military conflict. The two remaining active divisions in the proposed force structure are specifically designed for the terrain and threats in each of our likely Major Theater Wars. These divisions take advantage of forward basing, and troop rotational exercises to maintain the appropriate presence and capability at the outset of hostilities. Campaign Divisions are the first units in the force structure to be downsized, reconfigured or eliminated as the situation in these two regions changes.

Reserve components play an essential role in the new concept. Each of the CONUS based contingency divisions has a round up brigade. Additionally, the Army's strategic combat reserve resides in four enhanced divisions vice the current eight divisions of non-enhanced units. The savings in force structure allow for the creation of combat support and combat

service support units that are in desperate need to execute the Army's part of the national military strategy.

A final and very important change in our reserve structure is the creation of ten regional defense zones, each with homeland defense and rear area stability capabilities. These forces rotate through deployment vulnerability windows for support to SSCs. This system provides predictability for the civilian-soldier and his employer, and provides the right troops for the right tasks in smaller scale contingencies. It also alleviates some of the pressure on the active force while simultaneously lowering the demand on particularly high demand reserve component units.

The force proposals in this paper meet the future challenges to our Army. Mission tailorable, rapidly deployable, and lethal; this dominant landpower Army is a full spectrum organization capable of controlling land and people in any environment. The Total Army design facilitates global engagement without sacrificing soldier quality of life, preparedness for homeland defense, or readiness for sustained major theater conflict. It is the force required to fight and win our nation's wars in the 21st century.

WORD COUNT: 6,636

ENDNOTES

¹ Honorable Robert M. Walker and General Dennis J. Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 1999 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1998), 26.

² Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1998 Strategic Assessment, Engaging Power for Peace, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1998, 1.

³ Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), 3.

⁴ National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense, National Security Strategy in the 21st Century, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), 15.

⁵ Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 21.

⁶ Steven Metz, "Which Army After Next? The Strategic Implications of Alternative Futures", Parameters: Landpower in the 21st Century, April 1998, 13-15.

⁷ Ibid., 15.

⁸ Toffler, 39.

⁹ Metz., 15.

¹⁰ Dr. Jeffrey Record, The Creeping Irrelevance of U.S. Force Planning, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), 4.

¹¹ National Defense Panel., 14.

¹² Arthur Brill, "USMC Hones Its Urban-Warfare Combat Skills", Sea Power, March 1998, 45.

¹³ National Defense Panel., 11.

¹⁴ William G. Rosenau, "Every Room Is a New Battle: The Lessons of Modern Urban Warfare", Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 20, Number 4, (Washington DC: Taylor and Francis, 1997), 375.

¹⁵ A National Security Strategy for a New Century, (Washington DC: The White House, 1997), i.

¹⁶ Building on the President's National Security Strategy, the Department of Defense conducted a Quadrennial Defense Review as a fundamental and comprehensive examination of America's defense needs from 1997 to 2015. This document along with the National Security Strategy, the Joint Strategy Review and Joint Vision XXI serve as the foundation for the National Military Strategy.

¹⁷ National Military Strategy, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), 2. First, **shape** the international environment through deterrence, peacetime engagement activities, and active participation and leadership in alliances. Secondly, **respond** to the full spectrum of crises across the complete range of military operations, from humanitarian assistance to fighting and winning major theater wars (MTW), and conducting concurrent smaller-scale contingencies. Last but not least, **prepare now** for a less desirable future, by maintaining global military superiority through transformations in doctrine, organization and a revolution in military affairs.

¹⁸ Ibid., 21. From a readiness perspective, the force structure must be able to meet the most demanding deployment requirements...and mitigate the potential negative effects of high operational tempo and personnel tempos.

¹⁹ Air Force Basic Doctrine Document 1, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), 42.

²⁰ Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Bounding the Air Power Debate", Strategic Review, Fall 1997, 51.

²¹ Ibid., 42.

²² Naval Doctrine Publication 1, (Washington, DC: US Govenment Printing Office, 1994), 61.

²³ Ibid., 63.

²⁴ Ibid., 65.

²⁵ Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review., 30. Naval power projection capability is based on a QDR force of 12 aircraft

carriers, 11 air wings, 50 attack submarines, and 116 surface combatants.

²⁶ Naval Doctrine Publication 1., 68.

²⁷ Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review., 30. Each MEF is comprised of a command element, a division, an aircraft wing, and a service support group.

²⁸ Headquarters, USMC, Ship-To-Objective Maneuver, (Department of the Navy, 1997), A-1.

²⁹ Honorable Robert M. Walker and General Dennis J. Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 1999 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1998), iii.

³⁰ Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review., 29.

³¹ The ARNG force structure includes eight infantry divisions, fifteen enhanced combat brigades, and three artillery brigades. USAR forces provide specialized skill functions such as civil affairs and psychological operations as well as Combat Support and Combat Service Support capability to the Total Army.

³² Honorable Robert Walker and General Dennis J. Reimer, A Statement of the U.S. Army Fiscal Year 1999, (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, February 1998), 2.

³³ Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, June 1993), 1-4.

³⁴ General (Ret) Frederick J. Kroesen, A 'Second Version' of the Army Story, Army Magazine, September 1998, 10. Coupled with the manpower and OPTEMPO challenges to training the force, is the inadequacy of the current operations and maintenance budget. This manifest itself in under-funded helicopter flying hour programs and road mileage for tracked vehicles, both of which are at their lowest level since operation Desert Storm.

³⁵ Congressional Budget Office, Structuring the Active and Reserve Army for the 21st Century, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), xiii. Including current National Guard restructuring initiatives this leaves a deficit of 15,700 required support troops to sustain the force design for Army

XXI, while maintaining a surplus of 60,000 reserve combat troops with no direct role in fighting anticipated conflicts.

³⁶ TRADOC, The Force XXI Heavy Division or Armored Expeditionary Division, Slide Presentation, 1998. Special operations forces are capable of both direct action and military to military contacts. Strike forces, built around a Cavalry model and the focus of the Army After Next, are brigade sized units capable of rapid deployability, combined arms, and decisive and limited stability assistance and support operations (SASO).

Contingency forces consist of four light divisions (two with forcible entry capability) and three mounted divisions. The light contingency forces are CONUS based, rapidly deployable, modernized and capable of decisive operations and SASO. The heavy forces have greater decisive capabilities, but are not as rapidly deployable, do not have forced entry capability, and are not organized to conduct SASO.

The fourth category is campaign forces. These forces consist of two mechanized and one armor division, both forward deployed and CONUS based. They have the same capabilities as the mounted contingency forces.

³⁷ 3-73 Armor, the only Airborne Armor in the US Army, was deactivated in 1997 due to cancellation of the AGS as a replacement system for the M551 Sheridan. The AGS is the only tank that can be air dropped with the Division Ready Brigade of the 82nd Airborne or 101st Air Assault Divisions.

³⁸ Kroesen., 10.

³⁹ General (Ret) Gordon R. Sullivan and Col (Ret) Michael Harper, Hope is Not a Method, (New York: Random House, 1996), 32-33. Unlike the British, who were unprepared for war, France had been preparing for renewed war with Germany for two decades and had executed a major modernization program during the 1930s.

⁴⁰ Other SOF give the National Command Authorities a dominant maneuver and precision engagement capability that is especially unique to the Army.

⁴¹ Until a more advanced method of deployment is discovered, this translates to a brigade sized unit in each of the forward deployed strike divisions and one of the CONUS based strike divisions being capable of parachute assault. The remaining forcible entry division has two brigades parachute capable.

⁴² Stephen V. Cole, "Armored Vehicle Update", For Your Eyes Only; An Open Intelligence Summary of Current Military Affairs, Issue #460, 9 November 1998, 460-3. The FIV is currently scheduled for fielding in 2012. It will travel at 100km/hr, weigh under 20 tons, and carry a fire-and-forget weapon able to destroy any other vehicle 10km away while moving at high speed. In the interim, the Marine Corps LAV would be an excellent substitute for operational testing and concept verification. Gunners and Drivers, a planning staff, and organizational maintenance are organic to the FIV battalion.

⁴³ Weapon Systems, United States Army 1998 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1998), 171. Crusader is SADARM capable, which gives the commander extended stand off range to engage tier two armor threats in conjunction with rotary and fixed wing aviation.

⁴⁴ HIMARS can be transported by C130 aircraft and requires 30 percent fewer sorties when compared to the current tracked M270 MLRS battery.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 177. Mounted on a HMMWV chassis, LOSAT fires kinetic energy missiles that will defeat all predicted future armored combat vehicles.

⁴⁶ Additionally, command and control, aerial volcano mining, limited aeromedevac, and intelligence collection and jamming are all capabilities provided to the ground commander by this battalion.

⁴⁷ TRADOC, The Force XXI Heavy Division or Armored Expeditionary Division, Slide Presentation, 1998.

⁴⁸ The Limited Conversion Design division reduced its total number of tanks from 257 to 221. The reduction of 36 MBTs logically follows the argument that the M1A2 is a more capable tank and that in the joint and precision strike environment of the 21st century, increasingly other systems will kill enemy tanks on the battlefield at extended ranges.

⁴⁹ Assignment tours to the SWA Division are unaccompanied short tours for the forward-deployed units. The reinforcing brigades rotate forces into theater to pre-positioned stocks for contingency exercises.

⁵⁰ The Anti-tank battalion has four companies; two equipped with LOSAT and two with the Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile (EFOGM) .

⁵¹ Each Division has a DIVARTY, and an Aviation Brigade that resembles its counterpart in the Assault Division.

⁵² For example, there is one peace enforcement brigade (resembles light infantry) and one MP brigade in each zone. The ten regional defense zones coincide with the 10 FEMA zones.

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